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 1	  
Dilemmas	  of	  Memory:	  The	  Mind	  is	  not	  a	  Tape	  Recorder	  Steven	  D.	  Brown	  (University	  of	  Leicester)	  Paula	  Reavey	  (London	  South	  Bank	  University)	  
Introduction	  Many	  researchers	  who	  have	  gravitated	  towards	  Discursive	  Psychology	  can	  produce	  very	  vivid	  accounts	  of	  when	  exactly	  it	  was	  that	  they	  ‘lost	  their	  faith’	  in	  cognitive-­‐experimental	  psychology.	  For	  one	  of	  us,	  it	  was	  during	  a	  lecture	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Reading,	  listening	  to	  an	  eminent	  psychologist	  describe	  the	  relationship	  of	  cognitive	  architecture	  to	  the	  brain	  using	  the	  well	  known	  metaphor	  of	  software	  running	  on	  hardware.	  Perhaps	  the	  metaphor	  was	  striking	  and	  innovative	  when	  it	  was	  freshly	  minted.	  But	  by	  the	  late	  1980s,	  it	  seemed	  quite	  impoverished.	  Is	  that	  it?	  Is	  that	  what	  the	  rich	  contours	  of	  human	  experience	  come	  down	  to?	  Could	  it	  really	  be	  so	  simple?	  Edwards	  and	  Potter’s	  (1992)	  critique	  of	  ‘truth’	  in	  cognitive-­‐experimental	  approaches	  to	  memory	  and	  their	  alternative	  formulation	  of	  a	  discursive	  treatment	  of	  remembering,	  arrived	  at	  a	  fortuitous	  moment.	  Rather	  like	  the	  embattled	  Conservative	  government	  of	  the	  time,	  whose	  Chancellor,	  Nigel	  Lawson,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  central	  figures	  of	  the	  piece,	  so	  it	  felt	  that	  the	  dominant	  regime	  –	  the	  dreaded	  cognitivists	  –	  were	  losing	  their	  grip	  on	  the	  discipline.	  A	  new	  intellectual	  force	  was	  emerging,	  not	  from	  the	  heartlands	  of	  power,	  but	  from	  highly	  unlikely	  places	  such	  as	  Manchester,	  Milton	  Keynes,	  and	  most	  surprising	  of	  all,	  Loughborough.	  Change	  was	  coming.	  Or	  at	  least	  that	  is	  how	  things	  felt,	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  In	  what	  follows	  we	  will	  try	  to	  describe	  exactly	  why	  The	  Chancellor’s	  Memory	  offered	  such	  a	  rewarding	  challenge	  to	  theoretical	  and	  methodological	  sensibilities,	  one	  that	  continues	  to	  shape	  and	  inform	  our	  own	  work	  today.	  But	  we	  will	  also	  try	  to	  make	  clear	  how	  that	  piece	  formalized	  the	  terms	  of	  engagement	  with	  cognitive-­‐experimental	  psychology	  in	  a	  way	  that	  has	  ultimately	  been	  highly	  unproductive.	  We	  can	  see	  in	  this	  early	  work	  the	  effort	  to	  elevate	  discourse	  and	  conversation	  analysis	  beyond	  the	  status	  of	  mere	  methodology	  to	  the	  foundations	  for	  a	  new	  form	  of	  Psychology	  itself.	  And	  it	  is	  here	  that	  the	  Loughborough	  approach	  came	  to	  be	  somewhat	  peculiarly	  modeled	  on	  the	  regime	  it	  sought	  to	  supplant,	  the	  Blairist	  New	  Labour	  to	  the	  Thatcherism	  of	  cognitive-­‐experimental	  psychology,	  if	  you	  like.	  The	  challenges	  of	  working	  through	  this	  difficult	  legacy	  will	  be	  one	  of	  our	  major	  themes.	  
Context	  Critical	  (Social)	  Psychology	  in	  the	  1980s	  had	  reached	  something	  of	  an	  impasse.	  The	  classic	  early	  works	  of	  authors	  like	  Ken	  Gergen,	  Rom	  Harré	  and	  John	  Shotter	  had	  performed	  extensive	  diagnosis	  of	  just	  what	  was	  wrong	  with	  the	  discipline,	  but	  they	  were	  less	  than	  illuminating	  as	  to	  what	  would	  need	  to	  be	  done	  to	  create	  a	  viable	  alternative.	  As	  Brown	  and	  Locke	  put	  it:	  The	  key	  texts	  of	  the	  crisis	  literature	  had	  all	  called	  for	  change	  in	  social	  psychology.	  To	  some	  extent	  ‘experiments’	  became	  seen	  as	  emblematic	  of	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all	  that	  was	  wrong	  with	  the	  discipline.	  The	  search	  for	  new	  methods	  then	  became	  at	  the	  same	  time	  shorthand	  for	  doing	  social	  psychology	  differently.	  However,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  crisis	  literature	  proved	  to	  be	  very	  thin	  in	  terms	  of	  specific	  recommendations	  for	  appropriate	  methodologies.	  This	  left	  a	  generation	  of	  researchers	  in	  the	  unfortunate	  position	  of	  being	  ‘against’	  experiments	  but	  with	  little	  sense	  of	  the	  alternatives	  (i.e.	  what	  they	  were	  actually	  ‘for’).	  (Brown	  &	  Locke,	  2010:	  376)	  	  It	  was	  in	  this	  very	  particular	  context	  that	  a	  ‘turn	  to	  language’	  became	  so	  appealing.	  Mick	  Billig’s	  (1987)	  work	  on	  rhetoric	  and	  Jeff	  Coulter’s	  (1979)	  application	  of	  ethnomethodology	  had	  both	  been	  instrumental	  in	  nudging	  debates	  about	  the	  problem	  of	  imputing	  mental	  states	  away	  from	  philosophical	  discussion	  and	  towards	  the	  issue	  of	  methods.	  We	  can	  see	  this	  clearly	  in	  Derek	  Edwards’s	  work	  in	  the	  1980s.	  Edwards	  &	  Goodwin	  (1985)	  argue	  that	  lexical	  development	  in	  children	  is	  poorly	  grasped	  when	  it	  is	  treated	  in	  terms	  of	  gradual	  conceptual	  understanding,	  because	  this	  implies	  that	  ‘thinking’	  precedes	  ‘doing’.	  However,	  by	  looking	  at	  ‘real	  world’	  instances	  of	  children’s	  social	  interactions,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  language	  is	  deployed	  pragmatically	  by	  the	  child	  to	  ‘do	  things’	  before	  its	  referential	  function	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  established.	  This	  leads,	  in	  Edwards	  &	  Mercer	  (1987),	  to	  a	  concern	  with	  how	  the	  language	  of	  instruction	  in	  a	  classroom	  setting	  can	  construct	  understanding	  as	  a	  shared,	  communicative	  accomplishment.	  	  	  Dave	  Middleton’s	  early	  work	  shared	  this	  concern	  with	  the	  linguistic	  steering	  of	  children’s	  activities,	  having	  been	  part	  of	  the	  group	  that	  refined	  the	  experimental	  demonstration	  of	  ‘scaffolding’	  in	  parent-­‐child	  interactions	  (see	  Woods	  &	  Middleton,	  1975;	  Woods,	  Bruner	  &	  Ross,	  1975).	  These	  studies	  were	  critical	  to	  a	  move	  in	  developmental	  psychology	  of	  placing	  cognitive	  development	  in	  a	  socio-­‐cultural	  context.	  Together,	  Edwards	  &	  Middleton	  took	  these	  varied	  ingredients	  of	  pragmatics,	  communicative	  settings,	  interaction	  and	  ‘thinking	  through	  doing’,	  and	  applied	  them	  to	  the	  study	  of	  memory.	  Why	  exactly	  it	  is	  that	  they	  chose	  to	  focus	  on	  memory,	  rather	  than	  any	  of	  the	  other	  key	  topic	  areas	  of	  either	  developmental	  or	  social	  psychology,	  is	  a	  little	  unclear.	  There	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  certain	  arbitrariness	  here,	  much	  as	  there	  is	  with	  Potter	  &	  Wetherell’s	  (1987)	  treatment	  of	  attribution	  theory	  or	  Potter	  &	  Litton’s	  (1985)	  engagement	  with	  social	  representations,	  where	  the	  point	  of	  the	  exercise	  is	  deconstruct	  ‘traditional’	  approaches	  by	  showing	  the	  viability	  of	  a	  rhetorical	  and	  discursive	  alternative,	  rather	  than	  a	  sustained	  effort	  to	  move	  the	  topic	  on	  per	  se	  (see	  also	  Edwards	  et	  al,	  1992:	  445).	  To	  this	  end,	  Edwards	  &	  Middleton	  conducted	  a	  series	  of	  studies	  using	  both	  quasi-­‐experimental	  methods	  (the	  ‘E.T.’	  study	  –	  Edwards	  &	  Middleton,	  1986)	  and	  semi-­‐naturalistic	  data	  collection	  (the	  family	  photographs	  study	  –	  Edwards	  &	  Middleton,	  1988).	  These	  studies	  generated	  transcribed	  interactional	  material	  that	  Edwards	  &	  Middleton	  analysed	  to	  show	  how	  versions	  of	  past	  events	  were	  jointly	  negotiated	  in	  an	  argumentative	  context	  using	  a	  variety	  of	  discursive	  devices	  (see	  Middleton	  &	  Edwards,	  1990).	  	  The	  Chancellor’s	  Memory	  paper	  builds	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Middleton	  &	  Edwards	  by	  refining	  the	  focus.	  In	  the	  edited	  volume,	  Collective	  Remembering,	  a	  fairly	  wide-­‐
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ranging	  agenda	  had	  been	  set	  out	  that	  included	  themes	  such	  as	  the	  ‘social	  practice	  of	  commemoration’,	  the	  ‘social	  foundation	  and	  context	  of	  individual	  memory’	  and	  ‘social	  institutional	  remembering	  and	  forgetting’.	  These	  themes	  are	  fairly	  marginal	  to	  Edwards	  &	  Potter	  (1992),	  who	  concentrate	  instead	  on	  the	  wholesale	  ‘bracketing	  out’	  of	  subjectivity	  and	  experience,	  along	  with	  the	  methods	  of	  experimental	  psychology.	  If	  the	  earlier	  work	  had	  implied	  that	  discourse	  analysis	  and	  pragmatics	  expanded	  the	  toolkit	  of	  psychology,	  here	  Edwards	  &	  Potter	  were	  clear	  that	  it	  was	  instead	  intended	  to	  replace	  them:	  	   [I]n	  any	  account	  of	  conversational	  remembering,	  what	  is	  required	  is	  not	  merely	  an	  extension	  of	  traditional	  cognitive	  concerns	  into	  real-­‐world	  settings,	  but	  a	  re-­‐focusing	  of	  attention	  upon	  the	  dynamics	  of	  social	  action,	  and	  in	  particular,	  of	  discourse.	  (Edwards	  &	  Potter,	  1992:	  188)	  	  The	  argument	  turns	  upon	  an	  initial	  critique	  of	  Ulrich	  Neisser’s	  (1981)	  paper	  on	  ‘John	  Dean’s	  Memory’.	  Neisser’s	  career,	  like	  that	  of	  Jerome	  Bruner,	  straddled	  the	  emergence	  of	  cognitive	  psychology	  in	  the	  1970s.	  Both	  had	  been	  trained	  in	  the	  heady	  mix	  of	  Gestalt	  psychology	  and	  perceptual	  research	  and	  had	  arrived	  at	  the	  conclusion,	  contra	  the	  dominant	  behaviourist	  paradigm,	  that	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  study	  ‘thinking’	  as	  an	  active,	  reflexive	  force	  in	  shaping	  human	  action	  rather	  than	  the	  residual	  echo	  left	  by	  stimulus-­‐response	  chains.	  As	  Graham	  Richards	  (2010)	  and	  Jean-­‐Pierre	  Dupuy	  (2000)	  have	  shown,	  it	  is	  difficult	  for	  us	  to	  now	  properly	  appreciate	  just	  how	  radical	  information	  theory	  and	  cybernetics	  was	  to	  ‘pre-­‐cognitive’	  psychologists.	  Notions	  such	  as	  feedback	  loops	  and	  signal/noise	  pairings	  made	  it	  possible	  to	  envisage	  a	  psychological	  subject	  embedded	  in	  an	  informational	  ecology	  in	  which	  she	  or	  he	  could	  operate	  as	  an	  active	  agent.	  However,	  it	  is	  to	  Neisser’s	  very	  great	  credit	  that,	  despite	  having	  drawn	  together	  the	  implications	  of	  information	  theory	  for	  a	  Cognitive	  Psychology,	  he	  later	  came	  to	  see	  (as	  did	  Bruner)	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  dogmatism	  of	  the	  ‘standard	  model’	  of	  cognitive	  processes	  that	  had	  initially	  formulated.	  	  In	  the	  1981	  paper,	  published	  in	  Cognition:	  The	  international	  journal	  of	  Cognitive	  
Science,	  Neisser	  is	  performing	  a	  rather	  delicate	  act.	  He	  is,	  in	  effect,	  telling	  an	  audience	  of	  committed	  cognitive-­‐experimentalists	  that	  they	  have	  been	  getting	  something	  very	  important	  wrong.	  Because	  they	  have	  studied	  memory	  solely	  in	  laboratory	  settings,	  they	  have	  blinded	  themselves	  to	  the	  complexity	  of	  how	  memory	  actually	  functions	  in	  daily	  life:	  	   In	  a	  psychological	  experiment,	  it	  is	  relatively	  easy	  to	  determine	  whether	  what	  the	  subject	  says	  is	  true.	  The	  experimenter	  knows	  what	  really	  happened	  because	  she	  staged	  it	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  or	  because	  she	  kept	  a	  record	  with	  which	  the	  subject’s	  report	  can	  be	  compared.	  Because	  life	  does	  not	  keep	  such	  records,	  legal	  testimony	  is	  usually	  evaluated	  in	  more	  indirect	  ways:	  corroborative	  witnesses,	  cross-­‐examination,	  circumstantial	  evidence.	  For	  some	  of	  Dean’s	  testimony,	  however,	  it	  is	  now	  possible	  to	  compare	  what	  he	  said	  with	  a	  factual	  record:	  the	  Presidential	  Transcripts.	  This	  comparison	  will	  enable	  us	  to	  assess	  the	  accuracy	  of	  his	  memory	  rather	  precisely.	  In	  addition,	  it	  may	  clarify	  our	  theoretical	  conceptions	  of	  memory	  itself.	  (Neisser,	  1981:	  2)	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  This	  passage	  is	  interpretatively	  rich.	  Neisser	  contrasts	  what	  happens	  inside	  the	  laboratory	  with	  what	  happens	  outside	  of	  it	  (i.e.	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  human	  experience).	  Experimentalists	  are	  correct	  to	  be	  confident	  in	  the	  findings	  of	  memory	  experiments,	  he	  states,	  because	  they	  have	  ‘staged’	  events	  in	  such	  as	  way	  as	  to	  have	  a	  clear	  point	  of	  comparison.	  But	  outside	  of	  the	  laboratory,	  this	  is	  simply	  not	  possible.	  However,	  all	  is	  not	  lost!	  Sometimes	  institutions	  create	  records	  of	  their	  own	  which	  may	  act	  in	  ways	  analogous	  to	  experimental	  practices.	  If	  the	  audience	  is	  willing	  to	  hear,	  Neisser	  will	  go	  on	  to	  demonstrate	  just	  what	  can	  be	  done	  if	  one	  cares	  to	  look	  closely	  at	  these	  records.	  	  	  In	  this	  invitation	  to	  follow	  him	  ‘outside	  the	  laboratory’,	  Neisser	  simultaneously	  flatters	  and	  entices	  his	  audience.	  At	  the	  time	  he	  was	  already	  a	  grandee	  figure	  in	  the	  discipline,	  a	  world-­‐renowned	  figure	  and	  founder	  of	  the	  paradigm	  in	  which	  the	  audience	  were	  deeply	  embedded.	  But	  he	  was	  also	  a	  figure	  who	  had	  become,	  suddenly	  and	  unexpectedly,	  rather	  controversial.	  Three	  years	  earlier,	  Neisser	  had	  attempted	  to	  engage	  this	  same	  audience	  of	  hardcore	  cognitivists	  with	  rather	  less	  enticing	  statement	  -­‐	  ‘If	  X	  is	  an	  interesting	  or	  socially	  important	  aspect	  of	  memory,	  then	  psychologists	  have	  hardly	  ever	  studied	  X’	  (Neisser,	  1978:	  4).	  The	  1981	  passage	  needs	  to	  be	  alongside	  the	  1978	  statement.	  By	  the	  time	  of	  John	  
Dean’s	  Memory,	  Neisser	  has	  blown	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  his	  professional	  capital,	  he	  can	  no	  longer	  demand	  his	  audience’s	  attention,	  he	  has	  instead	  to	  work	  to	  whet	  their	  appetite	  with	  a	  taster	  of	  what	  might	  await	  them	  if	  they	  were	  prepared	  to	  suspend	  their	  prejudices.	  	  This	  is	  not	  the	  way	  that	  Edwards	  &	  Potter	  (1992)	  read	  Neisser’s	  invitation.	  They	  take	  it	  as	  demonstration	  that	  whilst	  he	  is	  making	  a	  ‘significant	  and	  welcome	  departure’	  (p.189),	  in	  the	  end	  a	  leopard	  never	  really	  changes	  its	  spots.	  He	  remains	  fixated	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  it	  is,	  somehow,	  possible	  to	  establish	  the	  ‘truth’	  of	  what	  happened,	  and	  thereby	  assess	  the	  veridicality	  of	  what	  is	  remembered.	  The	  alternative	  analysis	  that	  Edwards	  &	  Potter	  (1992)	  conduct	  is	  developed	  first	  in	  relation	  to	  John	  Dean’s	  testimony	  and	  then	  further	  fleshed	  out	  using	  the	  ‘Lawsongate’	  example.	  Their	  key	  argument	  is	  that	  throughout	  his	  testimony,	  ‘Dean’s	  truth	  is	  indistinguishable	  from	  his	  mode	  of	  accounting’	  (p.194).	  The	  various	  claims	  he	  makes	  around	  what	  he	  can	  and	  cannot	  remember	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  he	  organizes	  his	  accounts	  of	  the	  meetings	  with	  Nixon	  are	  treated	  as	  rhetorically	  organized	  to	  attend	  to	  the	  ongoing	  interactional	  pragmatics	  of	  the	  hearings.	  Edwards	  &	  Potter	  make	  a	  very	  compelling	  case	  that	  variation	  in	  the	  accounts	  that	  Dean	  offers	  –	  sometimes	  appearing	  to	  make	  ‘verbatim’	  recall,	  at	  other	  times	  decrying	  that	  his	  ‘mind	  is	  not	  a	  tape	  recorder’	  –	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  contextually	  occasioned.	  In	  building	  this	  argument,	  Edwards	  &	  Potter	  draw	  support	  from	  Molotch	  &	  Boden’s	  (1985)	  work,	  which	  focused	  on	  a	  different	  set	  of	  data	  to	  that	  used	  by	  Neisser,	  made	  of	  up	  of	  transcripts	  of	  the	  hearing	  Dean	  attended	  where	  he	  was	  questioned	  by	  a	  US	  Senator	  widely	  considered	  to	  be	  ‘Nixon’s	  man’,	  who	  was	  as	  a	  consequence	  hearably	  antagonistic	  towards	  Dean.	  	  Neisser	  is	  then	  seen	  as	  having	  only	  ‘half	  the	  story’.	  	  The	  Lawsongate	  material	  gets	  a	  very	  similar	  treatment,	  although	  one	  which	  probably	  benefits	  from	  the	  cultural	  knowledge	  that	  Edwards	  &	  Potter	  bring	  to	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the	  material	  (e.g.	  how	  the	  Parliamentary	  ‘lobby’	  system	  works;	  background	  knowledge	  on	  the	  political	  fortunes	  of	  the	  ruling	  Conservative	  Party).	  One	  of	  the	  key	  aspects	  to	  the	  analysis	  is	  how	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  ‘missing	  tape’	  is	  treated	  in	  the	  exchanges.	  Here	  there	  is	  apparently	  no	  possibility	  of	  establishing	  a	  ‘bottom	  line’	  account	  of	  ‘the	  truth	  of	  what	  happened’.	  Edwards	  &	  Potter	  thus	  demonstrate	  that	  pragmatically	  oriented	  claims	  to	  ‘truth’	  are	  central	  resources	  to	  the	  unfolding	  of	  social	  action,	  rather	  than	  matters	  that	  lay	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  analyst.	  Here	  we	  see	  an	  empirical	  working	  through	  of	  what	  would	  come	  to	  be,	  for	  a	  time,	  a	  very	  particular	  preoccupation	  in	  Discursive	  Psychology	  –	  the	  absence	  of	  ‘bottom	  line’	  accounts	  –	  which	  would	  go	  on	  to	  be	  developed	  in	  its	  own	  right	  in	  Death	  and	  
Furniture.	  	  A	  number	  of	  other	  stylistic	  and	  methodological	  details	  of	  the	  piece	  are	  worth	  remarking	  on	  here.	  The	  analysis	  is	  initially	  framed	  with	  the	  three	  themes	  of	  ‘function’,	  ‘variation’	  and	  ‘construction’.	  This	  loose	  framing	  of	  the	  way	  that	  discourse	  works	  is	  found	  in	  both	  Discourse	  and	  Social	  Psychology	  and	  Collective	  
Remembering,	  before	  becoming	  superseded	  by	  the	  more	  tightly	  organized	  Discourse	  Action	  Model	  (DAM)	  in	  Discursive	  Psychology.	  Whether	  or	  not	  the	  apocryphal	  story	  is	  correct	  that	  DAM	  was	  created	  to	  satisfy	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  reviewers	  of	  Edwards	  &	  Potter’s	  Psychological	  Review	  piece	  (‘where’s	  the	  damn	  theory	  then?’),	  it	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  suppose	  that	  nascent	  Discursive	  Psychology	  became	  more	  formalized	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  effort	  to	  communicate	  the	  approach	  to	  a	  cognitive-­‐experimental	  audience.	  The	  
Chancellor’s	  Memory	  is,	  after	  all,	  published	  in	  the	  journal	  Applied	  Cognitive	  
Psychology	  –	  the	  first	  and	  last	  time	  its	  avid	  readers	  were	  offered	  such	  a	  methodological	  joyride	  outside	  the	  laboratory,	  we	  imagine.	  	  
What	  Happened	  Next	  	  The	  response	  to	  the	  effort	  made	  in	  The	  Chancellor’s	  Memory	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  cognitive-­‐experimental	  community	  can	  best	  be	  gauged	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  published	  commentaries	  to	  an	  invited	  paper	  that	  Edwards,	  Middleton	  and	  Potter	  contributed	  to	  The	  Psychologist.	  The	  Edwards	  et	  al	  (1992)	  piece	  opens	  by	  repeating	  many	  of	  the	  objections	  to	  the	  laboratory	  study	  of	  memory	  discussed	  by	  Middleton	  &	  Edwards	  (1990)	  and	  Edwards	  &	  Potter	  (1992),	  before	  briefly	  summarizing	  recent	  work	  at	  Loughborough	  using	  DAM	  as	  a	  guide.	  The	  tone	  is	  interesting.	  If	  Neisser,	  in	  John	  Dean’s	  Memory,	  attempts	  to	  lure	  psychologists	  from	  the	  laboratory	  with	  the	  promise	  of	  the	  delights	  in	  store	  outside,	  Edwards	  et	  al	  are	  telling	  cognitive-­‐experimentalists	  that	  their	  jobs	  have	  been	  outsourced	  to	  more	  effective	  workers	  and	  they	  might	  as	  well	  leave	  the	  laboratory	  before	  it	  is	  closed	  down.	  Unsurprisingly,	  the	  responses	  range	  from	  the	  nonplussed	  to	  barely	  restrained	  fury.	  Some	  reject	  discursive	  work	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  is	  simply	  unscientific:	  	   If	  you	  cast	  your	  lot	  in	  with	  the	  empiricists	  in	  the	  seventeenth	  century,	  and	  feel	  a	  thrill	  at	  trouncing	  the	  rationalists,	  then	  the	  study	  of	  memory	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century	  impose	  a	  simple	  criterion	  to	  determine	  the	  truth	  of	  a	  hypothesis:	  systematic,	  controlled	  observation	  yielding	  replicable	  results.	  Can	  discourse	  analysis	  provide	  such	  data?	  (Banaji,	  1992:	  448).	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  On	  this	  count,	  Discursive	  Psychology	  does	  not	  meet	  the	  bar	  for	  an	  empirical	  science.	  But	  the	  argument	  is	  reversed	  by	  Roediger	  &	  Wheeler,	  who	  see	  a	  potential	  ‘gold	  mine’	  of	  data	  but	  with	  very	  little	  theoretical	  coherence:	  	   we	  have	  tried	  several	  times	  to	  comprehend	  the	  nine	  tenets	  of	  DAM	  …	  but	  …	  fear	  that	  we	  have	  failed.	  The	  model	  seems	  so	  general	  that	  is	  excludes	  nothing	  …	  At	  one	  point	  in	  our	  efforts	  to	  understand	  discursive	  remembering	  we	  looked	  up	  discursive	  in	  the	  Oxford	  American	  Dictionary	  (1980)	  and	  were	  informed	  discursive	  means	  ‘rambling	  from	  one	  subject	  to	  another’.	  Just	  so.	  (Roediger	  &	  Wheeler,	  1992:	  453)	  	  These	  two	  arguments	  –	  Discursive	  Psychology	  as	  neither	  sufficiently	  empirical	  nor	  convincingly	  theoretical	  –	  would	  be	  repeated	  time	  after	  time	  in	  the	  coming	  decades.	  And	  the	  response	  would	  eventually	  harden	  into	  a	  mantra:	  Discursive	  Psychology	  is	  rigorously	  empirical,	  but	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  rigor	  exceeds	  the	  narrow	  and	  naïve	  definitions	  of	  scientificity	  used	  by	  cognitive-­‐experimentalists	  (e.g.	  Edwards,	  2012);	  Discursive	  Psychology	  rejects	  ungrounded	  theorizing,	  instead	  producing	  descriptions	  of	  the	  pervasive	  features	  of	  social	  life	  that	  are	  superior	  to	  mere	  conceptual	  deduction	  (e.g.	  Potter,	  2012a).	  	  	  One	  further	  response	  is	  worth	  considering.	  Alan	  Baddeley	  –	  the	  Godfather	  of	  British	  psychology	  of	  memory	  –	  asks	  whether	  discursive	  work	  properly	  concerns	  memory	  at	  all:	  	   What	  emerges	  then	  is	  that	  the	  authors	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  social	  interaction	  between	  members	  of	  groups,	  and	  its	  verbal	  expressions,	  and	  that	  find	  remembering	  a	  useful	  topic	  for	  generating	  such	  interaction.	  Hardly	  a	  model	  of	  memory,	  but	  potentially	  a	  very	  interesting	  topic.	  (Baddeley,	  1992:	  447)	  	  We	  might	  see	  this	  simply	  as	  Baddeley	  displaying	  his	  displeasure	  at	  the	  lack	  of	  respect	  he	  and	  his	  work	  had	  been	  shown	  by	  these	  upstarts	  whose	  names	  were	  barely	  known	  in	  the	  hallowed	  circles	  of	  the	  Experimental	  Psychological	  Society	  –	  ‘In	  conclusion	  then,	  while	  I	  do	  not	  propose	  to	  give	  up	  cognitive	  psychology,	  I	  am	  intrigued	  to	  know	  what	  Dr	  Edwards	  and	  his	  colleagues	  have	  been	  finding	  out	  about	  groups	  reminiscing’	  (p.448).	  But	  he	  also	  has	  a	  point.	  The	  Chancellor’s	  
Memory,	  along	  with	  the	  Edwards	  et	  al	  (1992)	  piece,	  is	  not,	  strictly	  speaking	  about	  ‘memory’	  at	  all.	  It	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  show	  how	  the	  subject	  matter	  parsed	  by	  cognitive	  psychology	  can	  be	  lifted	  wholesale	  into	  a	  discursive	  approach.	  This	  will	  be	  the	  long-­‐term	  project	  of	  Discursive	  Psychology	  –	  setting	  out	  a	  way	  of	  doing	  Psychology	  as	  the	  study	  of	  the	  discursive	  practices	  in	  which	  ‘mental	  life’	  is	  rendered	  operant	  in	  the	  pragmatics	  of	  communication.	  As	  Edwards	  &	  Potter	  (1992)	  conclude:	  	   Our	  recommendation	  is	  to	  let	  go	  of	  a	  commitment	  to	  mind	  as	  a	  pre-­‐existing,	  independently	  knowable	  explanation	  of	  talk	  and	  action	  …	  Like	  the	  ‘truth’,	  the	  cognitions	  that	  are	  thought	  to	  apprehend	  and	  distort	  it	  are	  also	  researchable	  as	  discursive	  formulations,	  as	  versions	  of	  mental	  life,	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framed	  in	  talk	  and	  text,	  and	  oriented	  to	  the	  pragmatics	  of	  communication.	  The	  study	  of	  how	  conceptualizations	  of	  cognitive	  processes	  are	  deployed	  in	  everyday	  and	  scientific	  discourses	  will	  be	  a	  major	  focus	  of	  further	  work.	  (Edwards	  &	  Potter,	  1992:	  211)	  	  Even	  if	  one	  is	  sympathetic	  to	  what	  is	  being	  said	  here	  (as	  indeed	  we	  are!),	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  what	  purpose	  is	  served	  by	  ‘recommending’	  to	  cognitive-­‐experimentalists	  that	  they	  ‘let	  go’	  of	  the	  paradigmatic	  basis	  on	  which	  their	  intellectual	  commitments,	  and	  indeed	  careers,	  are	  formed.	  Everything	  we	  know	  about	  paradigms,	  since	  Kuhn	  (1962),	  suggests	  that	  communities	  of	  researchers	  are	  not	  simply	  persuaded	  into	  new	  modes	  of	  working,	  they	  are	  reluctantly	  forced	  to	  do	  so	  when	  the	  groundswell	  of	  evidence	  makes	  current	  practices	  untenable.	  Interestingly,	  in	  the	  decade	  that	  separates	  John	  Dean’s	  Memory	  from	  The	  
Chancellor’s	  Memory,	  a	  movement	  had	  begun	  –	  the	  ‘everyday	  memory’	  tradition	  (Conway,	  1991)	  –	  that	  is	  now,	  arguably,	  building	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  groundswell	  that	  might	  bring	  about	  the	  sort	  of	  conceptual	  re-­‐orientation	  that	  Edwards	  &	  Potter	  called	  for.	  It	  was	  within	  this	  emergent	  body	  of	  work	  that	  Neisser	  rebuilt	  his	  reputation	  after	  the	  1978	  comments	  (Neisser,	  1982;	  Fivush	  &	  Neisser,	  1994).	  	  	  It	  is	  unclear	  what,	  if	  anything,	  is	  gained	  in	  epistemic	  terms	  by	  making	  unequivocal	  assertions	  about	  what	  is	  and	  what	  is	  not	  to	  be	  properly	  called	  ‘Psychology’	  given	  the	  diverse	  and	  complex	  historical	  emergence	  of	  the	  discipline.	  But	  Baddeley’s	  barb	  that	  that	  Discursive	  Psychology	  has	  no	  ‘model	  of	  memory’	  does	  stick.	  To	  treat	  remembering	  as	  primarily	  researchable	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  interactional	  formulation	  of	  descriptions	  and	  claims	  about	  the	  past	  is	  to	  miss	  what	  is,	  for	  all	  of	  us,	  a	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  ‘memory’.	  We	  all	  feel	  a	  connection	  between	  what	  we	  are	  doing	  now	  and	  our	  personal	  and	  collective	  histories.	  That	  felt	  connection,	  which	  we	  might	  gloss	  as	  a	  ‘flow	  of	  experience’,	  is	  a	  critical	  resource	  that	  we	  all	  draw	  upon	  in	  making	  sense	  of	  any	  given	  interaction.	  Whilst	  it	  most	  certainly	  does	  not	  drive	  how	  we	  ‘frame	  versions	  of	  mental	  life	  in	  talk	  and	  text’	  in	  any	  causal	  way,	  and	  most	  definitely	  is	  not	  adequately	  grasped	  with	  the	  kinds	  of	  ‘models	  of	  memory’	  associated	  with	  Baddeley,	  the	  flow	  of	  experience	  is	  a	  significant	  issue	  for	  any	  putative	  psychology	  of	  memory.	  	  
Critique	  	  In	  this	  last	  section,	  we	  want	  to	  begin	  by	  pointing	  to	  a	  division	  within	  Discursive	  Psychology	  that	  occurs	  around	  the	  publication	  of	  The	  Chancellor’s	  Memory.	  Following	  the	  reception	  of	  Collective	  Remembering,	  Dave	  Middleton	  signed	  a	  contract	  with	  the	  publisher,	  Sage,	  to	  author	  a	  research	  monograph,	  provisionally	  entitled	  Social	  Remembering,	  by	  1992.	  As	  is	  the	  way	  with	  such	  projects,	  there	  was	  some	  drift	  in	  the	  timeline...	  In	  fact,	  the	  book	  was	  not	  published	  until	  many	  years	  later,	  in	  2005,	  with	  a	  different	  title	  The	  Social	  Psychology	  of	  Experience,	  and	  with	  one	  of	  us	  attached	  as	  a	  co-­‐author.	  	  	  Why	  did	  it	  take	  so	  long	  to	  complete	  this	  book?	  If	  one	  reads	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  Edwards	  et	  al	  (1992)	  piece,	  there	  are	  various	  indications	  of	  what	  Social	  
Remembering	  might	  have	  looked	  like,	  had	  it	  been	  completed	  as	  planned.	  It	  would	  most	  likely	  have	  focused	  on	  remembering	  as	  a	  process	  for	  producing	  collectivity	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or	  ‘communities	  of	  memory’	  through	  a	  work	  of	  ‘becoming	  members	  again’	  (‘re-­‐membering’).	  Middleton	  would	  come	  to	  describe	  this	  process	  as	  the	  interdependency	  of	  the	  individual	  and	  the	  collective	  (see	  Middleton,	  2002).	  By	  this	  he	  meant	  that	  it	  was	  analytically	  important	  to	  keep	  a	  hold	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘the	  individual’,	  but	  just	  not	  in	  the	  way	  that	  cognitive-­‐experimental	  psychology	  had	  come	  to	  define	  it.	  This	  concern	  with	  personhood	  had,	  he	  felt,	  been	  jettisoned	  by	  Discursive	  Psychology	  in	  its	  move	  to	  ‘let	  go’	  of	  the	  philosophical	  and	  operational	  difficulties	  implied	  by	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘mind’.	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  explain	  why	  Middleton	  felt	  this	  was	  important,	  we	  have	  to	  consider	  where	  the	  project	  of	  ‘letting	  go	  of	  mind’	  has	  gone	  since	  in	  Discursive	  Psychology.	  Potter’s	  (2012b)	  short	  commentary	  on	  Creswell	  (2012)	  provides	  a	  good	  summary.	  In	  this	  piece,	  Potter	  responds	  to	  the	  resurgent	  interest	  in	  the	  term	  ‘experience’	  in	  contemporary	  social	  science.	  He	  cites	  the	  later	  Wittgenstein’s	  (1958)	  classic	  argument	  on	  thinking	  as	  language	  as	  having	  sufficiently	  addressed	  all	  relevant	  philosophical	  matters,	  and	  then	  details	  a	  range	  of	  foreboding	  methodological	  issues	  that	  confront	  the	  researcher	  who	  is	  nevertheless	  determined	  to	  find	  a	  means	  of	  engaging	  with	  experience	  as	  an	  extra-­‐discursive	  matter.	  Particularly	  ire	  is	  (justly)	  reserved	  for	  ‘Interpretative	  Phenomenological	  Analysis’	  (IPA)	  (see	  Smith	  et	  al,	  2009),	  which	  is	  seen	  as	  ducking	  the	  issue	  entirely	  by	  conflating	  talk	  about	  mental	  states	  with	  these	  states	  themselves.	  Discursive	  Psychologists,	  by	  contrast,	  start	  with	  ‘practices	  and	  people	  acting	  in	  relation	  to	  one	  another,	  and	  bracket	  off	  issues	  of	  cognition’	  (p.577).	  In	  detailing	  these	  difficulties,	  Potter	  performs	  himself	  as	  somewhat	  exasperated	  by	  ‘a	  common	  but	  unnecessary	  nostalgia	  for	  a	  more	  classic	  form	  of	  ‘interiority’’	  	  (p.586).	  This	  he	  names	  as	  either	  ‘dualism’	  or	  ‘cognitivism’.	  	  The	  alternative	  is	  to	  respecify	  psychological	  categories	  as	  interactionally	  occasioned	  descriptions	  made	  in	  particular	  communicative	  settings.	  He	  finds	  himself	  incredulous	  that	  	  ‘even	  after	  some	  20	  years	  since	  the	  publication	  of	  Discursive	  Psychology	  …	  researchers	  of	  all	  flavours	  still	  have	  difficulties	  in	  accommodating	  this	  radical	  move’	  (p.	  577).	  	  But	  what	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  ‘radical	  move’?	  It	  consists	  of	  reifying	  the	  very	  dualism	  it	  seeks	  to	  unpick.	  If	  there	  is	  something	  called	  ‘experience’	  that	  differs	  from	  discursive	  practice,	  then,	  the	  argument	  goes,	  it	  can	  only	  be	  located	  in	  the	  ‘interior’	  realm	  of	  the	  Cartesian	  subject.	  Cognition	  is	  either	  a	  discursive	  matter	  or	  an	  ‘in-­‐the-­‐head’	  matter	  (in	  which	  case	  it	  is	  probably	  either	  inaccessible	  or	  uninteresting	  and	  can	  be	  safely	  bracketed	  out).	  This	  is	  a	  version	  of	  cognition	  that	  is	  not	  altogether	  recognizable	  to	  contemporary	  cognitive	  science.	  The	  ‘extended	  mind’	  hypothesis	  of	  Clark	  &	  Chalmers	  (1998),	  for	  example,	  applies	  the	  term	  ‘cognition’	  to	  activities	  that	  occur	  ‘outside	  the	  head’	  as	  well	  as	  ‘inside’.	  John	  Sutton	  and	  colleagues	  have	  developed	  ‘distributed	  cognition’	  approaches	  to	  social	  remembering	  that	  point	  to	  the	  crucial	  role	  of	  material	  mediators	  such	  as	  diaries	  or	  electronic	  devices	  (Sutton	  et	  al,	  2010).	  Recent	  work	  in	  ‘enactive’	  and	  ‘embodied’	  cognition	  aims	  at	  pushing	  further	  at	  the	  boundaries	  between	  self	  and	  world	  to	  see	  thinking	  as	  fundamentally	  a	  matter	  of	  doing	  (Colombetti,	  2014).	  And	  in	  contemporary	  philosophy,	  the	  displacement	  of	  cognition	  from	  a	  Cartesian	  version	  of	  mind	  continues	  apace	  with	  the	  renewed	  interest	  in	  the	  process	  philosophies	  of	  AN	  Whitehead	  (1985)	  and	  Henri	  Bergson	  (1991).	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The	  issue	  here	  is	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  terribly	  radical	  at	  all	  about	  the	  move	  of	  respecifying	  the	  psychological	  in	  interactional	  terms	  (as	  Ian	  Hacking	  1999	  once	  noted	  in	  relation	  to	  Coulter’s	  work).The	  impact	  of	  post-­‐dualist	  approaches	  such	  as	  Actor-­‐Network	  Theory	  and	  the	  double	  whammy	  of	  Foucauldian	  and	  Deleuzian	  philosophies	  as	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  choice	  for	  social	  scientists	  who	  see	  themselves	  on	  the	  cutting	  edge,	  has	  left	  contemporary	  work	  completely	  unfettered	  by	  any	  notion	  of	  interiority	  across	  vast	  swathes	  of	  Sociology,	  Human	  Geography,	  Cultural	  Theory,	  Management	  Studies,	  International	  Relations,	  Science	  and	  Technology	  Studies	  …	  and	  the	  list	  goes	  on.	  Discursive	  Psychologists	  are	  really	  pushing	  at	  an	  open	  door	  outside	  of	  the	  discipline	  with	  arguments	  such	  as	  the	  following:	  	   Clearly	  language,	  or	  discourse,	  is	  not	  all	  that	  there	  is	  in	  the	  world,	  not	  all	  that	  psychology	  and	  society	  are	  made	  of,	  and	  not	  the	  same	  thing	  as	  experience,	  or	  reality,	  or	  feelings,	  or	  knowledge.	  It	  is	  just	  language,	  discourse,	  or	  talk-­‐in-­‐	  interaction:	  not	  those	  other	  things.	  But	  it	  is	  the	  
primary	  work	  of	  language	  to	  make	  all	  those	  ‘other’	  phenomena	  accountable	  (Edwards,	  2006:	  42)	  .	  	  Few	  readers	  of	  outlets	  such	  as,	  say,	  Environment	  and	  Planning	  D:	  Society	  &	  Space	  or	  Journal	  of	  Cultural	  Economy	  would	  find	  anything	  here	  objectionable.	  In	  fact	  they	  might	  very	  well	  see	  themselves	  as	  taking	  a	  similar	  tack	  in	  their	  own	  empirical	  work,	  namely	  getting	  at	  ‘psychology’	  or	  ‘society’	  through	  the	  interactional	  work	  through	  which	  these	  things	  are	  constituted.	  And	  this	  brings	  us	  the	  central	  problem.	  Given	  the	  spread	  of	  post-­‐dualist	  thinking	  across	  the	  social	  sciences,	  what	  is	  it	  exactly	  that	  makes	  Discursive	  Psychology	  particularly	  ‘psychological’?	  Or	  put	  another	  way,	  if	  discourse	  is	  ‘not	  the	  same	  thing’	  as	  ‘experience’	  or	  ‘feelings’,	  then	  whose	  task	  is	  it	  to	  explore	  this	  difference	  in	  a	  post-­‐cognitive	  framework	  if	  not	  psychologists?	  Why	  keep	  strictly	  to	  the	  project	  of	  purifying	  any	  extra-­‐discursive	  conception	  of	  subjectivity,	  experience	  or	  mind	  from	  a	  psychology	  of	  memory?	  	  In	  a	  curious	  way,	  Edwards	  &	  Potter	  seem	  to	  have	  swapped	  places	  with	  Neisser.	  Where	  the	  latter	  once	  appeared	  to	  be	  attempting	  to	  prolong	  an	  ageing	  paradigm	  beyond	  its	  natural	  lifespan	  by	  proposing	  a	  move	  outside	  the	  laboratory,	  it	  is	  Potter	  who	  now	  claims	  that	  the	  increasing	  focus	  on	  naturalistic	  data	  in	  Discursive	  Psychology	  ‘promotes	  innovative	  analyses,	  pushes	  researchers	  off	  well-­‐worn	  social	  science	  agendas,	  and	  promotes	  powerful	  leverage	  for	  real-­‐life	  problems	  and	  issues’	  (2012b:	  577).	  If	  Neisser	  seemed	  to	  be	  suggesting	  that	  there	  was	  little	  that	  cognitivism	  could	  not	  explain,	  then	  Potter	  appears	  to	  be	  currently	  attracted	  to	  the	  same	  position	  –	  ‘Despite	  the	  burgeoning	  evidence	  of	  supposed	  ‘phenomenological’	  research,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  any	  other	  perspective	  provides	  as	  nuanced	  an	  account	  of	  psychological	  matters	  as	  they	  are	  threaded	  through	  people’s	  lives	  and	  provides	  a	  more	  systematic,	  rigorous	  and	  repeatable	  analysis’	  (2012b:	  586).	  This	  last	  phrase	  is	  particularly	  striking.	  Discursive	  Psychology	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  the	  Sociology	  of	  Scientific	  Knowledge,	  a	  discipline	  that	  was	  acutely	  aware	  of	  the	  vacuous	  nature	  of	  claims	  to	  ‘systematicity’,	  ‘rigor’,	  and	  most	  notoriously	  ‘replication’	  (see	  Ashmore,	  1989;	  Collins,	  1992;	  Gilbert	  &	  Mulkay,	  1984).	  To	  see	  these	  terms	  repeated	  here	  without	  any	  apparent	  irony,	  is	  most	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peculiar	  (compare	  with	  Edwards	  et	  al,	  1992:	  454).	  	  	  The	  main	  thrust	  of	  Edwards	  &	  Potter’s	  (1992)	  critique	  of	  Neisser	  is	  that	  he	  treats	  the	  Presidential	  Transcripts	  as	  a	  ‘bottom	  line’	  against	  which	  the	  veridicality	  of	  Dean’s	  testimony	  can	  be	  established.	  But	  what	  are	  we	  to	  make	  of	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  methodological	  drive	  towards	  more	  ‘systematic’	  and	  ‘rigorous’	  data	  collection	  in	  current	  Discursive	  Psychology,	  where	  only	  recorded	  ‘naturalistic	  data’	  is	  deemed	  adequate	  for	  analytic	  purposes,	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  data	  are	  dismissed	  as	  ‘got	  up’	  (see	  Potter,	  2012b)?	  Ashmore	  et	  al	  (2004)	  refer	  to	  this	  as	  ‘tape	  fetishism’	  –	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  tape	  functions	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  time	  machine	  that	  transports	  the	  analyst	  back	  to	  ‘where	  the	  action	  is’	  and	  thereby	  serves	  as	  hotline	  to	  getting	  in	  touch	  with	  the	  ‘richness’	  and	  ‘intricacies’	  of	  actual	  people	  interacting	  with	  each	  other	  in	  real	  time’	  (Potter,	  2012b:	  448).	  If	  the	  psychology	  of	  memory	  is	  arguably	  at	  its	  strongest	  when	  it	  entertains	  methodological	  pluralism	  and	  makes	  a	  concerted	  effort	  to	  constructively	  engage	  with	  analytic	  and	  epistemic	  differences,	  in	  precisely	  the	  manner	  that	  Edwards	  &	  Potter	  (1992)	  asked	  of	  their	  readers,	  then	  the	  spirit	  of	  early	  cognitivism,	  its	  dream	  that	  the	  difficult	  questions	  around	  the	  psychological	  were	  simply	  methodological	  issues	  to	  be	  overcome	  by	  better	  techniques,	  lives	  on	  proudly	  in	  contemporary	  Discursive	  Psychology.	  Neisser,	  at	  least,	  thought	  there	  was	  a	  way	  out	  of	  his	  laboratory.	  	  And	  that	  is	  why,	  we	  think,	  Middleton	  never	  published	  the	  planned	  version	  of	  
Social	  Remembering.	  He	  came	  to	  appreciate	  that	  the	  difficulties	  of	  constituting	  a	  genuinely	  social	  approach	  to	  the	  psychology	  of	  memory	  involved	  more	  than	  purely	  technical	  questions.	  The	  kind	  of	  analysis	  required,	  whilst	  still	  grounded	  in	  the	  evidential	  base	  supplied	  by	  ‘the	  tape’,	  could	  not	  be	  reduced	  to	  its	  re-­‐description,	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  his	  earlier	  work	  on	  ‘scaffolding’	  could	  not	  be	  hung	  entirely	  on	  experimental	  data.	  In	  his	  work	  after	  the	  Edwards	  et	  al	  (1992)	  piece,	  Middleton	  engaged	  with	  sociocultural	  psychology,	  an	  area	  where	  his	  many	  contributions	  continue	  to	  be	  celebrated	  (e.g.	  Middleton,	  1997;	  2002).	  He	  found	  here	  an	  intellectual	  project	  where	  memory	  was	  not	  treated	  as	  an	  arbitrary	  term	  for	  marking	  certain	  kinds	  of	  descriptive	  practices,	  but	  instead	  referred	  to	  substantive	  human	  activities	  for	  making	  use	  of	  the	  past	  in	  the	  present,	  and	  connected	  together	  important	  figures	  in	  the	  discipline,	  such	  as	  Bartlett	  and	  Vygotsky.	  Curiously,	  sociocultural	  psychology	  also	  offers	  a	  connection	  back	  to	  Neisser’s	  work,	  through	  the	  ‘sociocultural	  model	  of	  autobiographical	  memory’	  formulated	  by	  his	  former	  colleague,	  Robyn	  Fivush	  (Fivush	  et	  al,	  2011).	  It	  turns	  out	  that	  the	  meeting	  of	  cognitivism	  with	  discourse	  analysis	  announced	  by	  Edwards	  &	  Potter	  ended	  up	  taking	  place	  elsewhere.	  	  The	  book	  Middleton	  did	  eventually	  publish,	  The	  Social	  Psychology	  of	  Experience,	  was	  yet	  another	  turn.	  The	  problem	  of	  how	  to	  think	  continuity	  and	  interdependence,	  how	  we	  turn	  around	  on	  the	  past	  in	  the	  present,	  is	  thought	  through	  Bergson,	  Halbwachs	  &	  Bartlett.	  Whilst	  there	  is	  ample	  transcribed	  data	  to	  be	  found	  throughout,	  theory	  is	  used	  to	  ‘amplify’	  and	  transform	  what	  is	  on	  the	  tape	  to	  situate	  a	  given	  interaction	  in	  an	  account	  of	  a	  broader	  flow	  of	  experience.	  That	  text	  was	  one	  of	  the	  points	  of	  departure	  for	  our	  own	  current	  work	  (Brown	  &	  Reavey,	  2015),	  where	  we	  argue	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  difficult	  or	  distressing	  experiences,	  it	  is	  incorrect	  to	  assert	  that	  there	  a	  multitude	  of	  possible	  versions	  of	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events	  that	  are	  interactionally	  available	  to	  survivors.	  It	  seems	  to	  us	  that	  the	  problem	  is	  rather	  that	  persons	  feel	  ‘locked	  into’	  very	  specific	  versions	  of	  events.	  However,	  the	  dynamics	  of	  memory	  in	  play	  are	  broadly	  distributed	  across	  relationships,	  institutions,	  material	  affordances	  and	  –	  of	  course	  –	  discursive	  practices.	  What	  interests	  us	  is	  developing	  ‘post-­‐cognitive’	  accounts	  of	  remembering	  that	  nevertheless	  does	  not	  deny	  that	  we	  have	  a	  felt	  connection	  to	  our	  past	  that	  shapes	  the	  versions	  of	  events	  we	  are	  able	  to	  muster.	  	  	  We	  are	  not	  alone	  in	  wanting	  to	  expand	  the	  ‘rich	  surface’	  of	  human	  conduct	  around	  memory	  that	  is	  so	  celebrated	  by	  Edwards	  and	  Potter	  to	  include	  ‘extra-­‐discursive’	  matters.	  Kyoko	  Murakami’s	  (2012)	  work	  has	  begun	  to	  explore	  how	  a	  re-­‐thinking	  of	  temporality	  impacts	  on	  an	  interactional	  analysis	  of	  remembering.	  Lucas	  Bietti	  (2014)	  in	  involved	  in	  an	  audacious	  project	  to	  connect	  discursive	  approaches	  to	  memory	  with	  cognitive	  and	  linguistic	  models.	  David	  Kaposi	  (2011)	  has	  sketched	  out	  a	  view	  of	  the	  psychology	  of	  memory	  as	  a	  ‘political	  and	  moral	  science’	  based	  on	  a	  re-­‐reading	  of	  Edwards	  &	  Potter	  (1992).	  And	  closer	  still	  to	  home,	  Cristian	  Tileagã’s	  (2009;	  2011)	  ongoing	  research	  is	  mobilizing	  a	  concept	  of	  ideology	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  joint-­‐construction	  of	  the	  biographical	  and	  the	  historical.	  Much	  as	  we	  appreciate	  the	  purist	  connoisseurship	  of	  the	  way	  Discursive	  Psychology	  handles	  the	  ‘exquisite’,	  ‘intricate’	  and	  ‘rich’	  conversational	  practices	  that	  are	  –	  of	  course!	  –	  at	  work	  in	  remembering,	  we	  find	  these	  searching	  explorations	  of	  the	  messy	  and	  dirty	  meshwork	  of	  discursive	  and	  extra-­‐discursive	  relations	  more	  to	  our	  taste.	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